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1. Ellen E. Schultz, End Run: Companies Sue Union Retirees to Cut Promised Health Benefits,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2004, at A1.  Schultz and Theo Francis won the 2005 Loeb award in the Business
Beat Writing category for their series in the Wall Street Journal, “The Short Life of ‘Lifetime’ Health-Care
Benefits.”  The Gerald Loeb Awards, http://www.businessjournalism.org/content/4772.cfm?print=yes (last
visited Aug. 23, 2007).
2. Schultz, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
5. Schultz, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. ACF Indus. LLC, 2004 WL 3178257, at *1.
8. Id.; see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment at 1, Chapman v. ACF Indus. LLC., 430 F. Supp. 2d 570 (S.D. W. Va. 2006) (No. 3:04-0062),
2006 WL 498859 (listing other named plaintiffs, including the United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO,
and CLC).
9. The parties were similar but not exactly the same.  The declaratory suit named Mr. Chapman,
the USW, and Local Union No. 1652 of the USW as defendants.  ACF Indus. LLC, 2004 WL 3178257, at
*1.  The plaintiffs in the retirees’ suit included Mr. Chapman, Lowell Ward, William Spears, Willie
Jackson, Jr., and the USW as a class action against ACF, Program of Insurance Benefits for Retired
Bargaining Employees of AMCAR Division of ACF Industries, and Does one through twenty.  Plaintiffs’
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8, at 1.
I.  INTRODUCTION
Basil Chapman retired from ACF Industries, a railroad-car maker, after
thirty-eight years of service.1  In December 2003, he received an unexpected
phone call at his West Virginia home from a union representative, who
informed him that an ACF executive wanted to speak with him.2  When they
spoke, the executive informed Mr. Chapman that ACF was planning on
changing its retirees’ health coverage plan.3  The ACF plan would now have
a lifetime maximum benefit cap on hospital and surgical expenses for each
participant and would require retirees to make monthly contributions.4
According to court papers filed later, Mr. Chapman responded, “We have a
contract.  You can’t do that.”5  Then, he said that he would “file in federal
court” against ACF.6  The next business day, ACF filed a declaratory
judgment action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Missouri asking the court to rule that retiree benefits were not vested and that
ACF accordingly could alter benefits unilaterally.7  On January 26, 2004,
Mr. Chapman, other named plaintiffs, and their union sued ACF in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia.8
Thus began a jurisdictional struggle.  Both cases involved ACF, the
union, and the dispute over the retiree benefits.9  Which should proceed?
126 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:123
10. ACF Indus. LLC, About ACF, http://www.acfindustries.com/acf_information.asp (last visited
Aug. 23, 2007).
11. Id.  The other plant is located in Pennsylvania.  Id.
12. Schultz, supra note 1.
13. See James P. George, Parallel Litigation, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 769, 785-86 (1999).  Federal law
“disfavors” concurrent federal litigation concerning the same matter in multiple federal courts.  Courts
facing duplicative federal litigation may transfer and consolidate cases, dismiss or stay one of the cases, or
issue an injunction.  Id. at 786; see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th
Cir. 1993) (stating that parallel litigation would result in duplicative efforts, costs, and inconveniences to
the two parties, as well as a waste of judicial resources).
14. Schultz, supra note 1; see also infra Section IV.A.
15. See, e.g., Orthmann v. Apple River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119, 121 (8th Cir. 1984).
16. Id.
17. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183-84 (1952).
18. Id. at 183.
19. See infra Section IV.B.
20. See infra Section IV; see also William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging Termination or
Should the first-filed rule apply, allowing ACF’s declaratory judgment action
to proceed in Missouri (the Eighth Circuit), where ACF had its
headquarters?10  Or should the retirees’ suit, alleging that ACF’s conduct was
actionable under federal law, go forward in West Virginia (the Fourth
Circuit), where ACF operated one of its two plants,11 and where most ACF
retirees lived?12  Allowing both to proceed would result in inefficient
duplicative litigation.13  Not coincidentally, the early sparring over the forum
would likely have a huge impact on the outcome of the case.  The retirees
believed that ACF chose the Eighth Circuit because of its more favorable
relevant substantive law; the retirees preferred the Fourth Circuit in part
because of a prior ruling favoring retirees in a similar case.14
Under the first-filed rule, a court may decline jurisdiction over an action
when another suit involving the same parties and issues has already been filed
in another district.15  Where two courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the court
with the first-filed case has priority to consider it.16  Judges are charged with
using their discretion in exercising this rule, which should not be applied in
a “rigid” or “mechanical” fashion.17  This policy helps conserve judicial
resources and promote comprehensive disposition of multiple, related cases.18
The application of this rule provoked a procedural battle in
Mr. Chapman’s case, as well as in other cases involving changes to retiree
benefits plans.19  These cases highlight the difficulties of applying the first-
filed rule in concurrent federal court litigation.  Choosing whether or not to
apply the first-filed rule is particularly important in retiree benefits litigation
because the federal courts of appeals have adopted several different
interpretations of the substantive law underlying these cases.20  This Note
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Modification of Retiree Welfare Benefits: A Plaintiff’s Perspective, 10 LAB. LAW. 91, 93-94 (1994); Jason
Blumberg, Comment, Bringing Back the Yard-Man Inference, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 195, 201-13
(2001); Debra J. Linder, Note, As Corporations Are Forced to Honor Postretirement Health Benefit
Promises, a Chorus Rises: Where, Oh Where, Has My Equity Gone?, 15 J. CORP. L. 763, 765-79 (1990);
Douglas Sondgeroth, Note, High Hopes: Why Courts Should Fulfill Expectations of Lifetime Retiree Health
Benefits in Ambiguous Collective Bargaining Agreements, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1215, 1231-43 (2001).
21. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
The district court in Dana, when discussing the application of the first-filed rule, approvingly cited a
Seventh Circuit statement that “[t]he wholesome purpose of declaratory acts would be aborted by its use
as an instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a forum.”  Id. (citing Tempco
Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1987)).
22. See supra note 20.
23. William T. Payne, John Stember & Stephen M. Pincus, Battling for Benefits, TRIAL, Dec. 2005,
at 31; see also Blumberg, supra note 20, at 201 (describing the Yard-Man inference and its importance in
retiree benefits cases); Sondgeroth, supra note 20, at 1231-42 (discussing various appellate court
interpretations of the substantive issues).
24. Other commentators have discussed federal-state parallel litigation issues.  See, e.g., George,
supra note 13, at 849-97.
25. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *1 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
26. Schultz, supra note 1.
27. ACF Indus. LLC, 2004 WL 3178257, at *1; see also Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 8 (listing other named plaintiffs in the retirees’
class action suit against ACF).
28. See infra Section IV.
focuses on the “procedural fencing” that precedes the substantive litigation in
federal district courts.21  It does not address at length the circuit splits that
inspire litigants to seek so vigorously the forum of their choice.22  Briefly
stated, some circuits apply a presumption that favors retirees, while others
apply a presumption that favors employers.  Retirees prefer circuits where the
presumption is in their favor; companies, preferring other venues, file
declaratory judgment actions elsewhere.23  (This Note, which deals with inter-
circuit disputes dealing with questions of federal law, does not address district
courts dealing with pending state court litigation.24)
Mr. Chapman, the ACF retiree surprised by changes to his health benefits
plan, found himself a defendant in the Missouri case.25  “I can’t understand
why they’re picking on me,” Mr. Chapman said.  “I’m just a retired guy who
was sitting on my porch.”26  One month later, he became a plaintiff as well
when he filed suit, along with his union, in West Virginia.27  Thus, application
of the first-filed rule in these cases necessarily involves the question of who
should be the plaintiff and who should be the defendant.
The concept of the “natural plaintiff” has informed district court rulings
in cases like the dispute between ACF and its retirees.28  Under a traditional
128 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:123
29. See infra Section III for a discussion of the natural-plaintiff concept.  See also Antony L. Ryan,
Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168-70 (2000).
30. LARRY W. YACKLE , FEDERAL COURTS 257 (2d ed. 2003); see also UAW v. Dana Corp., No.
3:99CV7603, 2000 WL 1182883, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2000) (characterizing the relationship between
a union and an employer in a first-filed dispute in terms of the aggrieved party).  In that case,
the union is the aggrieved party: it asserted and continues to assert that Dana violated the agreement.
It sought and continues to seek remedies for that breach.  Dana simply is responding to the union’s
complaint with a denial of any wrongdoing.  The union, to the extent that it prevailed, seeks to
enforce the arbitrator’s decision.  Dana, on the other hand, seeks to enforce no affirmative rights;
it, rather, seeks to have the award vacated. . . .  Dana has the right . . . to seek to have an arbitrator’s
award vacated. . . .  But neither that opportunity nor that practice alters the basic relationship
between the parties.  In this case, the union, as the party seeking a remedy, stands in the posture of
a plaintiff, while Dana, the putative wrongdoer, finds itself defending against that claim.
Id. (citation omitted).
31. See infra Section IV.B.1 (discussing the retirees’ approach in their memorandum to the court
in the ACF case).
32. See infra Section IV.B.
33. See As Workload and Resources Head in Opposite Directions, Crisis Looms for Federal Courts,
THE THIRD BRANCH, Mar. 2004, at 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar04ttb/crisis/index.html
conception of a party-initiated pleading system, the natural plaintiff is the
aggrieved party who chooses when, where, and how to go about bringing suit
to seek redress for her injuries.29  This type of suit, a “coercive” one, involves
a more “traditional” form of relief, such as compensatory damages or an
injunction.30  Retirees and their unions claim that they are the natural
plaintiffs, since they are the ones seeking redress for an injury—the impact of
benefits reductions—through a coercive suit.  They argue that, as the natural
plaintiffs, their choice of forum should prevail, even if they file their coercive
suit after the company files a declaratory judgment action seeking a
determination of the legality of the benefits cuts.31
This strategy has proved successful in some cases where courts have
found a natural plaintiff and allowed that party’s suit to proceed, even though
it was not the first-filed one.32  In this Note, I argue in favor of this approach.
District courts already face a long list of factors when resolving first-filed
disputes.  The concept of the natural plaintiff belongs on this list.  When
considering the application of the first-filed rule, courts should look for a
natural plaintiff.  If there is one, and that party is not the first-filer, courts
should be especially wary of applying the first-filed rule.  They should look
skeptically at attempts to procedurally fence natural plaintiffs out of their
choice of forum.
Such an analysis may require courts to undertake a more detailed factual
examination than would be required with a strict application of the first-filed
rule—a perhaps unwelcomed burden on overcrowded federal court dockets.33
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(describing increasing workloads and constrained funding for federal courts).
34. Smith v. McIver, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 532, 535 (1824).
35. Michael Cavendish, Understanding the First-to-File Rule and Its Anticipatory Suit Exception,
75 FLA. B.J. 24, 25 (2001).  For the rule to apply, the issues in the two suits must be essentially the same.
Id.
36. See George, supra note 13, at 789; see also Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d
93, 96 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he forum non conveniens argument should be addressed to the court in the first-
filed action.”); Schnabel v. Ramsey Quantitative Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 505, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)
(“This District has laid down a bright-line rule for situations such as this: ‘The court before which the first-
filed action was brought determines which forum will hear the case.’”); Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“Leaving the decision of the first to file
dispute to the court in which the first case was filed makes good sense, as it establishes a bright line rule,
which is as easy to apply as it is to understand.”).
However, this effort is justified to serve the interests of justice.  A skeptical
approach to first-filers who potentially are seeking to usurp the role of the
natural plaintiff would avoid rewarding parties who race to the courthouse.
Moreover, this approach would serve the interests of justice in retiree benefits
disputes without adversely affecting determinations in first-filed disputes
where there is no natural plaintiff.
Section II of this Note provides background to the first-filed rule and
recognized exceptions to it, especially those relevant to retiree benefits
litigation.  After Section III introduces the concept of the natural plaintiff,
Section IV reviews the application of the first-filed rule in selected company-
union disputes and highlights the use of the natural-plaintiff concept
throughout the cases.  Section V presents an argument for using the concept
of the natural plaintiff as a factor in resolving first-filed disputes.
II.  THE FIRST-FILED RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS IN CONCURRENT
FEDERAL LITIGATION
A.  The Purpose of the Rule and Guidance from Kerotest and Wilton
In an 1824 case involving a dispute over jurisdiction between a court of
law and a court of equity, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[i]n all
cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the court which first has possession of the
subject matter must decide it.”34  Since then, the first-filed rule has guided the
disposition of litigation involving the same (or similar) parties and issues by
giving a preference to the suit filed first in time.35  Usually, the court with the
first-filed suit decides where the case should be tried by determining whether
to enforce the first-filed rule or to allow an exception.36  Courts applying the
first-filed rule also consider other relevant issues, such as venue or transfers
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37. George, supra note 13, at 789-91.
38. See, e.g., id. at 785-86; Rohm & Haas Co. v. Brotech Corp., 770 F. Supp. 928, 935 (D. Del.
1991); see also Ryan, supra note 29, at 168-70.  The first-filed rule is sometimes called the “first-in-time”
rule.
39. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local 24, 751 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985).
40. Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941) (“The economic waste
involved in duplicating litigation is obvious.  Equally important is its adverse effect upon the prompt and
efficient administration of justice. . . .  [P]ublic policy requires us to seek actively to avoid the waste of
judicial time and energy.  Courts already heavily burdened with litigation with which they must of necessity
deal should therefore not be called upon to duplicate each other’s work in cases involving the same issues
and the same parties.”); see also Ryan, supra note 29, at 169.
41. W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n, 751 F.2d at 729.
42. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 184 (1952).
43. Berisford Capital Corp. v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 677 F. Supp. 220, 225
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
44. Id. at 225.
45. Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 181-82.
46. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
47. Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 181-82.
48. Id. at 181.
based on forum-selection agreements.37  The first-filed (or first-to-file) rule
furthers important policy goals.38  One goal is comity, which requires federal
district courts “to exercise care to avoid interference with each other’s
affairs.”39  Another function is promoting efficiency by avoiding duplicative
litigation.40  Applying the first-filed rule also avoids “piecemeal resolution of
issues that call for a uniform result.”41  All of these goals are applicable to
retiree benefits litigation.
In Kerotest Manufacturing Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., the
Supreme Court cautioned lower courts not to apply the first-filed rule in a
“rigid mechanical” fashion.42  But the more that courts allow exceptions to the
rule, the more that the rationale for the rule evaporates.  A rule that is too
flexible would not serve purposes of judicial economy and predictability for
litigants because courts would have to balance “innumerable factors” and
conduct extensive inquiries in each challenged situation.43  At the same time,
the more rigid the rule, the less it serves the core purpose of furthering the
interests of justice.44
One of the suits in Kerotest was a declaratory judgment action.45  The
federal Declaratory Judgment Act allows a party to ask a court to “declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration.”46  Kerotest involved two cases concerning a patent dispute.47  In
the first-filed case, the C-O-Two Fire Equipment Company filed suit in federal
court in Illinois alleging patent infringement.48  Later, the Kerotest
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49. Id. at 181-82.
50. Id. at 182.
51. Id. at 183.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 183-84.
54. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
55. Id. at 286.
56. Id. at 289; see also Russell B. Hill, Should Anticipation Kill Application of the Declaratory
Judgment Act?, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 239, 245 (2004) (explaining that, prior to Wilton, circuit courts
were “widely divided regarding the standard of review” regarding district court application of the first-filed
rule, but that Wilton “settled the issue”).  But see Keith B. Hall, Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 46
LOY. L. REV. 101, 124-25 (2000) (stating that the Fifth Circuit generally reviews application of the first-
filed rule for abuse of discretion but will review the district court decision de novo, when the plaintiff raises
issues regarding the nature and scope of the doctrine, rather than its application on the facts, and citing
Cadle Co. v. Whataburger, Inc., 174 F.3d 599 (5th Cir. 1999)).
Manufacturing Company filed a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a) in federal court in Delaware to have two of C-O-Two’s patents
declared invalid.49  After protracted procedural litigation, the Third Circuit
eventually upheld a stay of the later-filed Delaware suit in favor of the first-
filed Illinois suit.50  In affirming that ruling, the Supreme Court recognized
that the Declaratory Judgment Act “has created complicated problems for
coordinate courts.”51  In these types of situations, either party may file suit.
According to the Court, “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to
conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation,
does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems.”52  Instead,
district court judges should have “an ample degree of discretion” in resolving
these disputes.53
The Supreme Court re-emphasized the extent of judges’ discretion in the
context of declaratory judgment actions in Wilton v. Seven Falls Co.54  In
Wilton, the Court stressed that the Declaratory Judgment Act confers “unique
and substantial discretion” on federal courts, which may decide whether or not
to accept jurisdiction over the action.55  Wilton also established that district
court procedural rulings on declaratory judgment actions are reviewed on an
abuse-of-discretion standard.56
B.  How Courts Apply the First-Filed Rule and Its Exceptions
Generally, the first-filed rule applies unless (1) the balance of
convenience “strongly favors” the forum of the second-filed suit, or (2) there
are special or “compelling” circumstances that justify an exception to the
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57. George, supra note 13, at 786-87; see also Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d
1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the first-filed rule “yields to the interests of justice” and is not
applied where a court finds “compelling circumstances” that support its abrogation).
58. George, supra note 13, at 786-87.
59. See, e.g., BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 1995), cited in Rexam, Inc. v. USW,
No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *2 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2003); Orthmann v. Apple
River Campground, Inc., 765 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1985), cited in ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No.
4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2004).
60. See, e.g., Plating Res., Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899 (N.D. Ohio 1999), cited in UAW
v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
61. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d at 1002 (8th Cir. 1993), cited in ACF, 2004 WL 3178257, at *2,
and Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *4-5.
62. EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988), cited in Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054,
at *2, and Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).
63. See, e.g., Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *5 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Supreme Int’l
Corp., 167 F.3d 417 (8th Cir. 1999) (trademark dispute)); Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *3 (citing
Tempco Elec. Heater Corp. v. Omega Eng’g, Inc., 819 F.2d 746, 749-50 (7th Cir. 1987) (patent dispute)).
There are many other circuit court cases involving the first-filed rule in the context of patent or trademark
disputes.  See, e.g., Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (patent dispute);
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (patent dispute); Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld
Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1991) (trademark dispute); Tempco, 819 F.2d 746 (trademark dispute);
Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1982) (patent dispute); Codex Corp. v. Milgo
Electronic Corp., 553 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1977) (patent dispute); William Gluckin & Co. v. Int’l Playtex
Corp., 407 F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1969) (patent dispute).
64. See George, supra note 13, at 804-05 (noting that tests and remedies for the first-filed rule that
are applied in patent cases are not always applicable to other types of cases, and that patent cases “appear
to make up a greatly disproportionate number of federal parallel cases and have developed somewhat
distinct rules”); see also Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 n.2
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (explaining the distinction between application of the first-filed rule in patent cases
versus other kinds of cases).  The Northern District of Ohio court noted that the Federal Circuit applies the
first-filed rule more rigorously in patent cases “to enable alleged infringers to relieve themselves of the
uncertainty that can result from a patent-holder’s delay in filing suit, and, as well, in view of the
consideration that all appeals in patent cases go to that court, thereby reducing the impetus to forum-shop.”
rule.57  If the court with the first-filed suit decides that an exception to the rule
applies, the court can dismiss, enjoin, or transfer the first action, or allow both
suits to proceed.58
The four employer-union cases discussed in detail in Section IV of this
Note draw on cases applying the first-filed tests in a variety of settings,
including tort actions59 and contract disputes.60  One often-cited case involved
a dispute between two competitors over hiring practices.61  Another important
case centered on a constitutional challenge to a federal agency’s subpoena.62
The four employer-union cases discussed in this Note sometimes cited
decisions involving declaratory judgment and coercive actions in trademark
or patent litigation.63  Patent cases, while not always applicable to other types
of disputes, are also relevant to retiree benefits litigation.64  Sometimes these
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Id. (citing Genentech, Inc., 998 F.2d at 937).  As a result, “decisions involving a race to the courthouse
between a declaratory judgment plaintiff and a patent holder probably are not of much precedential value
except in patent cases.”  Id.
65. See, e.g., Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 971 (stating that the Third Circuit adopted the first-filed rule
in Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929 (3d Cir. 1941), a case that involved a patent
dispute).
66. See infra Section II.B.2 for a further discussion of first-filed cases in the patent context.  See also
Daimler-Chrysler Corp., 133 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (noting differences between circuits in terms of the
strictness with which courts apply the first-filed rule).  Referring to briefs and arguments filed by the
defendants in its case, the Daimler-Chrysler court noted that the defendants “believe that this circuit applies
the first to file rule rigidly (i.e.,  in their favor), while the Seventh Circuit is less receptive, if not hostile,
to first-filed declaratory judgment actions.”  Id.  In support of this distinction, the court compared two first-
filed cases involving patent disputes, one in the Sixth Circuit and one in the Seventh Circuit.  Id.
67. George, supra note 13, at 787.
68. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
69. Id. at 508.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006); see also Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960) (interpreting the
“where it might have been brought” clause).
71. Ryan, supra note 29, at 176; see also Star Lines, Ltd. v. P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth., 442 F. Supp.
1201, 1207 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“The burden of persuasion regarding the appropriateness of a discretionary
transfer lies with the movant.”).  Transfers are granted only with “a clear cut and convincing showing by
defendant that the balance of convenience weighs strongly in favor of the transferee court . . . .”  Id.
(quoting Gen. State Auth. (of Pa.) for Benefit of Crompton-Richmond Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 314
F. Supp. 422, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
cases underlie a circuit’s adoption of the first-filed rule.65  They also provide
an example of contrasting approaches, since the courts of appeals vary in how
strictly they interpret the first-filed rule in patent cases.66
1.  The Balance of Convenience Test
The first test, balancing the conveniences between two forums, is similar
to a forum non conveniens analysis.67  The doctrine of forum non conveniens
allows a court to decline to hear a case, even when jurisdiction is authorized.68
Under that doctrine, the court will weigh relative advantages and obstacles to
trial in the forum and not allow a plaintiff to “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the
defendant by choosing an inconvenient forum.69
Venue transfer in the federal courts can be accomplished through 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), which allows a district court, considering “the convenience
of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice,” to transfer a case “to
any other district or division where it might have been brought.”70  Federal
courts are generally deferential to the plaintiff’s choice of venue, and
defendants’ motions under § 1404(a) are usually denied.71  Differences do
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72. Ryan, supra note 29, at 176-77.
73. William Gluckin & Co. v. Int’l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1969).
74. Id. at 177.
75. Id. at 179-80.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 180 (citing Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equipment Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
78. Id.
79. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858 (D. Minn. Oct. 30,
2003).
80. Id. at *1.
81. Id.
82. William T. Payne, Lawsuits Challenging Termination or Modification of Retiree Welfare
Benefits 26 (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Pittsburgh Law Review) (citing Anderson
v. Alpha Portland Indus., 836 F.2d 1512 (8th Cir. 1988)).  In Anderson, the Eighth Circuit stated that “we
disagree with Yard-Man to the extent that it recognizes an inference of an intent to vest. . . .  We believe
that it is not at all inconsistent with labor policy to require plaintiffs [retirees] to prove their case without
the aid of gratuitous inferences.”  836 F.2d at 1517.  But see Sloan v. BorgWarner Diversified Transmission
Prods. Inc., No. 06-10861, 2006 WL 1662634, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Mich. June 9, 2006) (“The [Yard-Man]
inference exerts a fair amount of influence in how these types of cases are resolved. . . .  However, under
Yard-Man, there is no legal presumption . . . .  Rather, the inference functions more to provide a contextual
understanding about the nature of labor-management negotiations over retirement benefits.” (citations
omitted) (internal quotations omitted)).
persist among federal courts in how much weight to give the various factors
that apply to an inconvenient transfer motion.72
In first-filed disputes, district courts have discretion in applying the
inconvenient forum balancing test.73  William Gluckin & Co. v. International
Playtex Corp. is a leading example of the application of a convenience test in
the context of two concurrently litigated federal cases.74  In William Gluckin
& Co., the Second Circuit reviewed the long list of factors that a New York
district court cited as support for its decision to allow a case to proceed in
New York instead of Georgia.75  These factors included, among others, the
identity of the “primary” party; the location of the main offices; where the
product was designed, produced, and advertised; and the location of counsel
and witnesses.76  In summary, the “whole of the war and all the parties to it”
were located in New York.77  The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision as not “unreasonable” given the circumstances.78
One recent retiree benefits case squarely addressed an inconvenient-venue
argument.79  In Rexam, Inc. v. United Steel Workers of America, Rexam, a
manufacturer of beverage cans, sought a declaratory judgment on whether it
could lawfully amend its retiree health benefits plan.80  Rexam filed in federal
court in Minnesota.81  By filing in the Eighth Circuit, Rexam chose a court that
rejects the Yard-Man inference, an approach that generally favors plan
participants.82  Seven days later, the union that had represented the retirees
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83. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *4.
84. Payne et al., supra note 23, at 31.
85. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *1.
86. The Rexam court considered more than just the first-to-file issue; among other topics, it
considered subject matter jurisdiction and ripeness of the retirees’ claims.  Id. at *2, *6.
87. Id. at *5.  See infra Section II.B.2 for a discussion of the “special circumstances” exceptions.
88. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *4-5.
89. Id. at *8.
90. Id. at *3.
91. Id. at *7.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
95. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 224778658, at *8.
sued Rexam in federal court in Ohio.83  By filing in the Sixth Circuit, the
union chose a court that applies the Yard-Man inference.84  Rexam sought to
enjoin the union’s parallel proceedings; the union moved to dismiss Rexam’s
claim or, alternatively, to transfer venue to Ohio.85
The district court in Minnesota retained jurisdiction over Rexam’s action
for multiple reasons.86  In its discussion of the first-filed rule, the court held
that there were no “compelling circumstances” to justify an exception to the
first-filed rule.87  It did not address the convenience issue.88  The court
analyzed the convenience issue later, when it denied the motion to transfer
venue to the Northern District of Ohio.89  First, the court examined the
convenience to the parties.  Rexam had offices in Chicago and Charlotte.90
Thus, Minnesota was not a logical venue choice, but the court noted that
“Minneapolis is easily accessible by air travel.”91  Transferring to Ohio would
not be significantly more convenient for the defendants’ unions, which were
based in Washington, D.C., and Pittsburgh.92  Next, the court considered the
convenience for witnesses.  The union suggested that it would call retirees
living in Pittsburgh and Toledo; the court noted, however, that Rexam’s
retirees lived in forty-eight states and Puerto Rico, so that factor was not
compelling.93  The only argument left under an inconvenient-venue argument
would be one to further “the interests of justice,”94 but the court referred to its
earlier exposition of the compelling circumstances factors for denying the
motion on those grounds.95
In Rexam, neither party had a strong argument for its choice of venue.
With retirees living throughout the United States, Rexam could have filed its
declaratory action in many different districts.  Minnesota suited it, though, and
the union did not have a compelling argument under § 1404(a) for moving the
case to Ohio.  Other large American companies seeking to amend retiree
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96. See Schultz, supra note 1 (“In the past two years, employers have sued union retirees across the
country.”); see also KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE OUTLOOK FOR RETIREE
HEALTH BENEFITS: FINDINGS FROM THE KAISER/HEWITT 2004 SURVEY ON RETIREE HEALTH BENEFITS
(2004), available at http://www.kff.org/medicare/7194/upload/Current-Trends-and-Future-Outlook-for-
Retiree-Health-Benefits-Findings-from-the-Kaiser-Hewitt-2004-Survey-on-Retiree-Health-Benefits.pdf.
The Kaiser Family Foundation surveyed large employers, most of them multi-state employers, that offered
retiree health benefits.  Id. at vi.  The survey found that 79 percent of the large employers had increased
retiree contributions to premiums in the past year.  Id. at xii.  The “vast majority” indicated that they
planned to increase retiree contributions for premiums, or raise cost-sharing requirements, or both, in the
coming year.  Id. at xiii.
97. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *7-8, *4-5.
98. Hill, supra note 56, at 239.  Hill describes the test for deciding first-filed disputes as one
composed of a “hodgepodge of factors.”  Id.
99. George, supra note 13, at 787-88 (footnotes omitted).
100. Id. at 788.
benefits programs are likely to be similarly situated to Rexam, with a wide
range of venue choices, since their retirees live in many different states.96
When the Rexam court applied the balance-of-convenience test, it did so after
already having decided that there were no compelling circumstances to justify
a departure from the first-filed rule.97  Likewise, a balance-of-convenience
argument may appear in other retiree benefits cases, but as in Rexam, it is not
likely to determine the outcome.  Instead, the real battles lie in the special
circumstances exceptions to the first-filed rule.
2.  The Special Circumstances Test
A variety of special circumstances could apply to a first-filed dispute.98
These factors include:
(1) the similarity of the claims, though perfect identity is not required;
(2) the relative progress of the two cases;
(3) the existence of a forum selection clause;
(4) a plaintiff’s need to litigate that claim individually rather than join a class;
(5) the need to consolidate related actions;
(6) multidistrict litigation transfer for pretrial purposes;
(7) lack of notice of the first-filed claim;
(8) having jurisdiction over necessary or desirable parties;
(9) discouragement of forum shopping;
(10) the bad faith filing of a declaratory judgment action; and
(11) “state interest” of the second forum.99
The party challenging the first-filed rule has the burden of proving special
circumstances.100
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101. See Hill, supra note 56, at 247-48; see also Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622,
628 (9th Cir. 1991).
102. Hill, supra note 56, at 248.
103. See YACKLE , supra note 30, at 257; see also Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers
Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 19 (1983) (“Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction over
declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive action to
enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”).
104. See Hill, supra note 56, at 248.  In patent cases, a company charged with infringing on another’s
patent might seek a declaratory judgment that its actions do not violate that patent.  Id. at 242-43.
“Uncertainty, insecurity and controversy can be crippling to a company as it decides whether to pursue a
course of conduct alleged to violate the rights of another.  Typically, the company has to choose between
capitulating to the demands of the accuser or possibly accruing significant damages—perhaps even
enhanced or punitive damages.”  Id. at 239.  A declaratory judgment action thus affords an alleged violator
the opportunity to have its rights declared, without having to wait for the alleged patent holder to sue it first.
Id.
105. Id. at 248.
106. Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952); see also George,
supra note 13, at 785-86.  The “wise judicial administration” concept also underlies the Colorado River
doctrine, which applies to state-federal parallel litigation, not to federal-federal litigation.  Id. at 803.  The
dual use of this principle “has led to confusion for courts that might be tempted to apply the multi-factored
Colorado River test in an intrafederal setting.”  Id.  For example, the Seventh Circuit once cited Colorado
River in an intrafederal situation, but later corrected that reliance.  Id.
In the context of first-filed disputes involving declaratory judgment
actions, the factors of bad faith, forum shopping, and the related anticipatory
lawsuit exception stand out.101  Courts are likely to accept a bad faith
argument when it appears that the plaintiff in the first-filed suit unfairly won
a race to the courthouse, such as when a declaratory plaintiff pretends to
engage in settlement negotiations while it stealthily prepares to file suit in the
forum of its choice.102  The anticipatory or imminent lawsuit exception often
appears when the plaintiff in the second-filed, coercive action—one seeking
a more traditional form of relief, such as compensatory damages or an
injunction103—claims that the first-filed declaratory action was filed in
anticipation of that suit.104  The possibility of forum shopping runs through
each of these factors, since a party might rush to file in order to select a more
desirable forum.105
The Kerotest recommendation of “wise judicial administration” serves as
the basis for determining when a court should or should not exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.106  In Kerotest,
the Supreme Court specifically referenced the possibility of forum shopping
and plainly disapproved of this tactic: “The manufacturer who is charged with
infringing a patent cannot stretch the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act to
give him a paramount right to choose the forum for trying out questions of
infringement and validity.  He is given an equal start in the race to the
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107. Kerotest, 342 U.S. at 185.
108. See George, supra note 13, at 802-04; see also Cadle Co. v. Whataburger, Inc., 174 F.3d 599,
603 (5th Cir. 1999); Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Alltrade, Inc. v.
Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 627-28 (9th Cir. 1991); W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Local
24, 751 F.2d 721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 977 (3d Cir. 1988); Pacesetter
Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1982); William Gluckin & Co. v. Int’l Playtex Corp.,
407 F.2d 177, 178 (2d Cir. 1969).
109. Compare, e.g., Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 989 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying
the first-filed rule after considering the possibility that the first-filed suit was an anticipatory one), with
Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d at 969 (rejecting the application of the first-filed rule when the first-filed suit was
filed in anticipation of an imminent enforcement action).
110. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d at 1007.
111. Id. at 1003.
112. Id. at 1003-04.
113. Id. at 1004.
114. Id. at 1007.
115. Id.
116. Id.
courthouse, not a headstart.”107  Courts analyzing first-filed disputes regularly
cite Kerotest.108  They also apply appellate first-filed precedents that vary in
how strictly they follow the first-filed rule and in the weight given to the
presence of an anticipatory suit and the likelihood of forum shopping.109
The Eighth Circuit’s “two red flags” test, which focuses on declaratory
judgment actions, is particularly applicable to retiree benefits cases.110  The
dispute in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. began when
Northwest sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court in Minnesota
that it was competing lawfully by hiring former American employees.111  Six
weeks later, American sued for injunctive relief in federal district court in
Texas.112  The district court in Minnesota applied the first-filed rule, enjoining
the American suit in Texas and allowing the Northwest suit to proceed.113  On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit noted that “[t]wo factors here send up red flags that
there may be compelling circumstances.”114  The “two red flags” test looks for
(1) an anticipatory lawsuit and (2) the fact that one of the actions is a
declaratory judgment, since those actions “may be more indicative of a
preemptive strike than a suit for damages or equitable relief.”115
The Eighth Circuit held that neither factor presented a compelling
circumstance in the case.  First, Northwest’s action did not fit the anticipatory
suit exception, since communications between the parties had given no
indication that American was imminently pursuing a suit.116  Second,
Northwest had a good argument for filing a declaratory judgment action, since
it claimed that its hiring practices had been “chilled by American’s intimation
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117. Id.
118. Id. (citing U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 920 F.2d 487, 489 (8th Cir. 1991)).
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Semmes Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 429 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1970); William
Gluckin & Co. v. Int’l Playtex Corp., 407 F.2d 177, 178-79 (2d Cir. 1969).
121. See, e.g., Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Schnabel v.
Ramsey Quantitative Sys., Inc., 322 F. Supp. 2d 505, 507, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that the defendant
had not met its “heavy burden” of proving there were “special circumstances,” such as forum shopping or
a determination that the first suit was the result of an anticipatory lawsuit, justifying the dismissal of the
first-filed action).
122. Factors Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 217.
123. Id. at 217.
124. Id. at 219.
125. Id.  The Second Circuit quoted Justice Brennan in support of its holding.  As Mr. Justice
Brennan had observed, “[t]he federal declaratory judgment is not a prize to the winner of a race to the
courthouses.”  Id. (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 119 n.12 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
126. See, e.g., Motion Picture Lab. Technicians Local 780 v. McGregor & Werner, Inc., 804 F.2d 16,
19 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he chief ‘special circumstance’ we have noted is our interest in discouraging forum
shopping.”).  In Factors, the Second Circuit cited to a district court case that addressed forum shopping.
Factors, Etc., Inc., 579 F.2d at 219 (citing Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc. v. Schneider, 435 F. Supp. 742,
747 (S.D.N.Y 1977)).
127. See EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988).
that Northwest was violating the law.”117  The court expressly contrasted
Northwest’s predicament with that in another case where the defendant in the
first-filed suit could be considered the true plaintiff in the second-filed suit.118
In its final conclusion, the Eighth Circuit implicitly addressed the concept of
forum shopping when it stated that Northwest, “in filing first, had neither
acted in bad faith nor raced to the courthouse to preempt a suit by American
in Texas.”119
The Second Circuit, which is known for weighing the balance of
conveniences,120 also considers anticipatory filings and forum shopping.121  In
Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., Factors threatened to sue Pro Arts for
allegedly infringing its exclusive commercial rights to the name and likeness
of Elvis Presley.122  Pro Arts responded by immediately filing an action
seeking a declaratory judgment that it had not infringed those rights.123
According to the court, the anticipatory nature of the declaratory judgment
filing could factor into the decision to allow an exception to the first-filed
rule.124  By permitting an exception to the first-filed rule, the Second Circuit
prevented the winner of the race to the courthouse from enjoying the forum
of its choice.125  Other Second Circuit cases explicitly mention forum-
shopping considerations.126
A leading Third Circuit case gave great weight to the possibility of forum
shopping.127  In EEOC v. University of Pennsylvania, the University
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128. Id. at 971.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 973, 975-76.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 978 (citing Rayco Mfg. Co. v. Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 588, 592 (S.D.N.Y
1957)).
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 64 and 66.
136. See Hill, supra note 56, at 254.
137. See supra note 64.
138. Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 938 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
139. Id.
140. Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (Fed. Cir. 1995).  The Serco court
challenged a national EEOC policy by filing suit in the district court for the
District of Columbia.128  The EEOC then filed an enforcement suit in a district
court in the Third Circuit.129  The district court judge in that case held that an
exception to the first-filed rule applied and refused to dismiss the EEOC’s
suit.130  The Third Circuit affirmed, basing its decision in large part on the
University’s obvious attempt at forum shopping.131  The court reasoned that
when the University filed suit, it knew that the EEOC’s enforcement action
was imminent and that Third Circuit precedent would likely favor the
EEOC.132  According to the court, the University’s conduct was “tantamount
to the blowing of a starter’s whistle in a foot race.”133  The court concluded
that the first-filed rule should not apply when one of the parties is trying to
“circumvent local law” and preempt an imminent enforcement action.134
Many first-filed disputes involving patent litigation include a discussion
of the anticipatory suit exception.135  Forum shopping is arguably less relevant
in patent cases because of the Federal Circuit’s role in promoting uniformity
in applying patent laws throughout the various district courts.136  Because
courts have developed a “distinct” set of rules for managing patent cases, rules
developed in the patent context should be considered with “caution” in other
contexts.137  However, these cases do demonstrate well how courts apply
differing perspectives to first-filed disputes.
Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a Federal Circuit case, stressed that
there must be a “sound reason” for allowing an exception to the first-filed
rule.138  The fact that the first-filed suit was a declaratory action did not
change the analysis since that judgment was “entitled to precedence as against
a later-filed patent infringement action.”139  Still, the Federal Circuit does
consider the anticipatory nature of a suit as a special circumstance that may
potentially warrant an exception to the first-filed rule.140  In terms of forum
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considered both the “race to the courthouse” factor and the convenience of the parties.  Id.  Ultimately, the
relative convenience of the parties was a “sound reason” to uphold the lower court’s decision not to
continue the declaratory suit.  Id. at 1040.
141. Genentech, Inc., 998 F.2d at 938.
142. 819 F.2d 746 (7th Cir. 1987).
143. Id. at 750.
144. Id. at 749.
145. See id. at 749-50.
146. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613 (7th Cir.
1939)).
147. Id. at 750.
148. Hill, supra note 56, at 239.
149. Id. at 254.
150. See Payne et al., supra note 23, at 31; see also Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539,
543-44 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing the presumption of vesting in retiree benefits cases and stating that
shopping, the Genentech court pointed out that first-filed suits may be
dismissed when forum shopping was the only motive for the suit, but not when
there are “sound reasons” for the first-filer’s choice of forum.141
The Seventh Circuit takes a different approach.  In Tempco Electric
Heater Corp. v. Omega Engineering, Inc.,142 the court stressed that it did not
adhere to a “rigid” first-filed rule.143  Rather, “[w]here, as here, the declaratory
judgment action is filed in anticipation of an infringement action, the
infringement action should proceed, even if filed four days later.”144  The
Tempco court was skeptical of the declaratory judgment filer who might be
acting to secure a more advantageous forum.145  Filing first did not give
Tempco the “right” to choose a forum, the court reasoned, noting that the
purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act “would be aborted by its use as an
instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a
forum.”146  Allowing the first-filer to prevail would encourage an “unseemly”
race to the courthouse in similar cases.147
Like the Genentech court, some critics disapprove of a liberal application
of exceptions to the first-filed rule.  One commentator protests overuse of the
anticipatory-suit exception, decrying its limiting effect on the ability of a party
to bring a declaratory judgment action to resolve the “uncertainty, insecurity
and controversy” that can be “crippling” to a company embroiled in a patent
dispute.148  However, the presence of an anticipatory suit also implicates
concerns about forum shopping.  While it might be reasonable to assert that
“the risk of outcome-determinative forum shopping in patent cases has been
largely eliminated,”149 that position is not justified in the retiree benefits
context, where substantive differences between the circuits are crucially
important to companies and retirees.150
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“[c]ases in other circuits are all over the lot”).
151. See George, supra note 13, at 786.
152. See supra Section II.B.
153. As “master of the complaint,” the plaintiff “has the option of naming only those parties the
plaintiff chooses to sue, subject only to the rules of joinder [of] necessary parties.”  Lincoln Prop. Co. v.
Roche, 546 U.S. 81, 91 (2005) (citing 16 J. MOORE ET AL ., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 107.14[2][c],
at 107-67 (3d ed. 2005).
154. For example, the well-pleaded complaint rule enables the plaintiff to “eschew[ ] claims based
on federal law,” so that the case will be heard in state court.  Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation
Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 831 (2002).
155. See Ryan, supra note 29, at 168.
156. Id. at 189; see also text accompanying YACKLE , supra note 30.
157. See Ryan, supra note 29, at 168-69 (discussing the plaintiff’s traditional privilege of selecting
the forum in which to bring a suit).
158. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).  In the forum non conveniens context,
relevant factors include, inter alia, the “relative ease of access to sources of proof” and other “practical
problems that make disposing of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.”  Id.
159. Koster v. (Am.) Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
III.  THE NATURAL PLAINTIFF AND FORUM-SELECTION PRIVILEGES
When a party asks a court to decide not to follow the first-filed rule, it is
essentially asking that court to favor the disfavored—that is, to let the second-
filed suit proceed instead of the first-filed suit.  Courts are understandably
reluctant to do so, since the first-filed rule serves important goals of judicial
economy and comity between courts.151  When making these decisions, courts
use the factors described in Section II.B.152  Another applicable factor is the
natural-plaintiff concept.
Under the common-law tradition, the plaintiff, as “master of the
complaint,” frames the issues of the case, deciding whom to sue,153 what
claims to bring,154 and where to sue.155  Given traditional notions of party-
initiated pleading systems, the natural plaintiff is the aggrieved party, or the
one with a cause of action for coercive relief.156
The Supreme Court has expressed support for the plaintiff’s forum-
selection privilege, or the exercise of the “plaintiff’s choice” principle.157  In
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, a 1947 forum non conveniens case, the Court stated
that a plaintiff may not “vex,” “harass,” or “oppress” the defendant by
choosing an inconvenient forum, but “unless the balance is strongly in favor
of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”158
In another 1947 case, the Court reasoned that the plaintiff should generally
“not be deprived of the presumed advantages of his home jurisdiction.”159  The
Court in Van Dusen v. Barrack reviewed lower court cases involving transfer
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160. 376 U.S. 612, 633 (1964).
161. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2006).
162. Ryan, supra note 29, at 169.
163. Id.
164. See Andrew Bradt, “Much to Gain and Nothing to Lose”: Implications of the History of the
Declaratory Judgment for the (b)(2) Class Action, 58 ARK. L. REV. 767, 771 (2006).
165. See EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 20 (2d ed. 1941); see also Daniel J.
Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2559 (1998).  In discussing
the need for anticipatory relief, Meltzer cited Borchard, who had stated, “in explaining the need for
declaratory judgments, a prospective victim should not be told ‘that the only way to determine whether the
suspect is a mushroom or a toadstool, is to eat it.’”  Id. (citing Edwin M. Borchard, The Constitutionality
of Declaratory Judgments, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 589 (1931)).
166. BORCHARD, supra note 165, at 18.
167. For a defense of the rights of declaratory judgment plaintiffs, see Hill, supra note 56.
168. See Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a Venue,
78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 102 (1999).
169. 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
of venue and noted that, “[o]f course[,] these cases allow plaintiffs to retain
whatever advantages may flow from the state laws of the forum they have
initially selected.”160
However, there are constraints on these privileges.  Statutory mechanisms
such as removal and transfer of venue161 give defendants tools as well.  These
provisions allow courts to invoke the principle of “judicial management,”
which elevates the importance of convenience and efficient resolution of
disputes.162  According to commentator Antony L. Ryan, the judicial
management and plaintiff’s choice principles “co-exist uneasily.”163
Declaratory judgment actions complicate matters.  Edwin Borchard, the
proponent of declaratory judgment actions whose work helped lay the
foundation for the federal Declaratory Judgment Act,164 stressed the utility of
this procedure.165  In these cases, “no traditional ‘wrong’ has yet been
committed or immediately threatened,” but there is a “cloud upon the
plaintiff’s rights” that “endangers his peace of mind, his freedom, his
pecuniary interests.  This is a tangible interest which the law protects against
impairment, and by protecting it, promotes social peace.”166  But are parties
filing declaratory judgment actions natural plaintiffs seeking to enforce their
rights,167 or are they potential defendants seeking to “appropriate” plaintiffs’
privileges by filing a declaratory judgment action?168
Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. gives insight into how courts should approach
declaratory judgment actions.169  The Wilton Court held that the Declaratory
Judgment Act confers “unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether
to declare the rights of litigants,” allowing federal courts to exercise their
discretion in deciding to hear declaratory judgment actions, rather than
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171. See Ryan, supra note 29, at 189-90.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 190.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
175. See supra note 96.
176. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Retiree Health Benefits: Time to Resuscitate?, at 2,
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/research/resrender.asp?id=W-559&page=2 (last visited Aug. 23, 2007); see
recognizing an absolute right in the litigant to bring such actions.170  However,
as Ryan stresses, Wilton’s ruling applied to a federal court dealing with a
question of state law.171  Thus, it left open the question of whether the ruling
applies when the parallel action is not in a state court but is in another federal
court where the claim arises under federal law.172  Concurrent federal-federal
cases invoke the judicial management principle, as courts seek to avoid
duplication and inefficiencies.  They also implicate plaintiff’s choice
principles; however, application of those principles is complicated by the
question of whether the first-filer, the declaratory judgment plaintiff, is really
a potential defendant in a coercive action who is attempting to assert
plaintiffs’ privileges, particularly the forum-selection privilege.  Thus,
according to Ryan, “[t]he more faithful application of the plaintiff’s-choice
principle . . . may be to defer to the choice of forum by the ‘natural plaintiff,’
which usually means favoring the action for coercive relief over the
declaratory-judgment action.”173
Retiree benefits cases present an example of the usefulness of identifying
the natural plaintiff and, where one is found, granting more deference to that
party’s choice of forum.  This approach enables courts to avoid a too-rigid
application of the first-filed rule—an inflexibility that would violate
traditional notions that the aggrieved party should determine the course of
litigation.174
IV.  APPLYING THE FIRST-FILED RULE IN EMPLOYER-UNION DISPUTES AND
THE THEME OF THE NATURAL PLAINTIFF
A.  Putting Retiree Benefits Disputes in Context
ACF Industries, which unilaterally altered medical benefits enjoyed by
Basil Chapman and his fellow retirees, is not alone.  Many other companies
have implemented or are considering the same course of action.175
Forty years ago, retiree health benefits were relatively inexpensive for
employer sponsors.176  Since then, health care costs have risen dramatically,
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also Eduardo Porter & Mary Williams Walsh, Benefits Go the Way of Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006,
at C1.  Porter and Walsh quoted Paul Fronstin, director of the Health Research and Education Program at
the Employee Benefit Research Institute, who remarked: “It was easy to offer these things 40 years ago
because they were cheap.  They’re not cheap anymore.”  Id.
177. Watson Wyatt Worldwide, supra note 176, at 2.
178. Id.
179. See supra note 96; see also Sondgeroth, supra note 20, at 1219-23 (describing trends in retiree
health benefits).
180. Ellen E. Schultz, Employer Actions Drive Health Costs For Retirees Higher, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 30, 2004, at B1.  In a later interview on PBS’s NOW program, Ellen Schultz went on to say: “In fact,
when retirees drop out it is boosting companies’ income.  And depending on how many people drop out,
you get enough gains added to your income on a quarterly basis that it can actually help you meet your
earnings targets.”  NOW, Science & Health: Aging in America, Pension Health Benefits, Retiree Health
Benefits (PBS television broadcast Apr. 1, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/now/
transcript/transcriptNOW113_full.html).
181. See, e.g., Shy v. Navistar Int’l Corp., No. C-3-92-333, 1993 WL 1318607 (S.D. Ohio May 27,
1993) (approving a class action settlement reducing retiree benefits for a corporation that had downsized
significantly and would likely have entered bankruptcy without changes to its benefits plan).  General
Motors has also been negotiating with its retirees.  See Jeff Green, GM Retirees May Fight Health Cuts;
Ford Union Members May Join, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 30, 2005, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=10000103&sid=aUR.kgr_0gIw&refer=us.
182. See, e.g., Rexam, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL
22477858, *1 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2003); ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL
3178257, *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2004).
183. See Payne et al., supra note 23, at 27.
184. Id.
185. Id.; see also, e.g., Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. United Steelworkers, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL
and more retirees began receiving those benefits.177  The combination of
“generous benefits, steadily increasing utilization rates, growing retiree
populations and rapidly escalating cost of services” has created fiscal
problems for some employers.178  Many companies have responded by
reducing coverage for future retirees; in a 2004 survey, 79 percent of the
companies surveyed had recently increased their retirees’ contributions for
premiums.179  Facing steep premium increases, some retirees drop out of the
plan; then, the company no longer pays their costs and can write the obligation
to pay the benefits off their recorded liabilities.180  Another approach is for the
company and the union to negotiate an agreement to reduce benefits.181
Some companies, including Rexam and ACF Industries, unilaterally
reduce benefits for already-retired workers.182  Retirees protesting benefit cuts
sue under federal law since state causes of action are generally preempted.183
Both union and non-union retirees can sue under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).184  Former union employees can sue
under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) as well as
ERISA.185  In these challenges, courts consider whether coverage was meant
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117923, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 2004) (describing the coercive action that union retirees brought against
Crown under the LMRA and ERISA).
186. See Payne et al., supra note 23, at 27 (citing Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388 (6th
Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
187. Id. at 28.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Sondgeroth, supra note 20, at 1230 (“The most important issue in welfare benefits
termination cases is whether the two parties to the agreement, the employer and the union, mutually
intended to provide benefits that lasted beyond the life of the agreement. . . .  If the language of the
collective bargaining agreement unambiguously describes the duration of the retirees’ medical benefits,
courts will abide by the language of the contract and consider that language to be completely indicative of
the parties’ intent.  If, instead, the language is ambiguous as to whether the benefits were intended to vest,
courts allow both sides to introduce extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties’ intentions at the formation of
the agreement.  The degree to which a court protects the expectations of the employees and considers the
context of the unionized workplace greatly affects both the determination of ambiguity and the ultimate
question of what the parties intended.” (footnotes omitted)).
191. 716 F.2d 1476, 1482 (6th Cir. 1983).
192. Payne et al., supra note 23, at 31; see also Rossetto v. Pabst Brewing Co., 217 F.3d 539, 541-44
(7th Cir. 2000) (surveying decisions dealing with the “much-litigated issue” of retiree health benefits and
discussing the “presumption” against vesting of health care benefits); Sondgeroth, supra note 20, at
1231-42 (discussing the circuit split).
193. Rossetto, 217 F.3d at 541.
194. See, e.g., id. at 539.  In that case, the retirees sued the employer for terminating their health
to be “vested” or “gratuitous” and subject to termination at the will of the
employer.186  Some governing plan documents unambiguously state that retiree
benefits must continue throughout retirement, so that the retirees would more
likely prevail.187  Alternatively, some state that the benefits are terminable, so
that the retirees would more likely lose.188  Other documents, however, are
ambiguous.189  Whether or not the documents are ambiguous is thus the central
legal issue in these cases.190
This is where the circuit split becomes important.  In UAW v. Yard-Man,
Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that “retiree benefits are in a sense ‘status’ benefits
which, as such, carry with them an inference that they continue so long as the
prerequisite status is maintained.”191  Other circuits, including the Fourth and
Eleventh, also apply this inference, while others do not.192
B.  Employer-Union Disputes
The substantive issues underlying retiree benefits disputes are “much-
litigated” ones.193  Serious consideration of the first-filed rule within these
cases is less common.  Such a case may proceed without any consideration of
the rule.194  Four relatively recent cases—three involving retiree benefits
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benefits.  The district court granted summary judgment to the employer.  Id. at 541-42.  The Seventh Circuit
reversed and remanded.  Id. at 547.
195. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, *1 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
196. 989 F.2d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1993).
197. ACF Indus. LLC, 2004 WL 3178257, at *2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at *3.
201. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Defer Consideration of
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004
WL 3178257 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2004), 2004 WL 2127571.
202. ACF Indus. LLC, 2004 WL 3178257, at *3.
disputes and one involving a labor dispute between a union and an
employer—illustrate recent application of the first-filed rule in the employer-
union context.  In all of these cases, the employer filed a declaratory judgment
action first and the union then filed a coercive action.  All of the courts
deciding this jurisdictional issue invoked, either explicitly or implicitly, the
concept of the natural plaintiff.
1.  ACF Industries, LLC v. Chapman
To return to the story of Basil Chapman and ACF Industries, the retirees
asked the Missouri District Court to dismiss ACF’s declaratory judgment
action, or, alternatively, to transfer the case to the federal district court in
West Virginia, the site of the retirees’ second-filed suit.195  Applying the “two
red flags” analysis established in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American
Airlines, Inc.,196 the Missouri court found that both red flags were evident.197
First, ACF, the plaintiff in the first action, knew that the retirees would file
suit.  Its action in announcing the changes and filing the declaratory judgment
action the very next business day indicated a disfavored “race to the
courthouse.”198  Second, ACF’s suit was a declaratory judgment action.199
The court did not stop there, though.  It invoked the concept of the natural
plaintiff when it dismissed ACF’s reliance on another case, in which “no other
suit was ever filed by the ‘natural plaintiffs,’ nor did the ‘natural plaintiffs’
seek dismissal based on another pending suit.”200  In contrast, the retirees who
alleged that ACF had violated provisions of the LMRA and ERISA in fact did
claim that they were “the natural plaintiffs and as such enjoy the right of
selecting their forum and framing the litigation.”201  The Missouri court agreed
with their position.202  Allowing ACF to win a race to the courthouse by
adhering to the first-filed rule would have deprived those natural plaintiffs of
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203. Id.
204. Id.  The Third Circuit cited this case when it rejected the “natural plaintiff” approach in a retiree
bzenefits dispute with different facts.  In re Amendt, 169 F. App’x 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential);
see infra text accompanying notes 300-02.
205. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).
206. Id.
207. Id. at *2.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *3.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969 (3d Cir. 1988) (setting forth reasons for courts
to allow exceptions to the first-filed rule, including where the first suit was motivated by forum shopping,
when the second-filed suit had developed further, or where the first-filer had sued in anticipation of another
action)).
212. Id. at *3 (citing Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900 Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1225 (3d Cir. 1989)).
their right to select the forum of their choice.203  Thus, the court in its
discretion transferred the Missouri case to West Virginia.204
2.  Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO
In June 2003, Crown Cork & Seal Company (Crown) reduced its
retirement benefits package and, on the same day, filed suit in federal district
court in Chicago (in the Seventh Circuit) for a declaratory judgment that its
action was proper.205  Twenty days later, Crown’s retirees and their union filed
suit in federal district court in Cincinnati (in the Sixth Circuit) against the
company.206  The retirees moved to dismiss the Chicago action, claiming that
it was a “pre-emptive strike” that improperly deprived the retirees of the right
to “frame their own claims and choose their own forum”—a right that the
retirees, as the natural plaintiffs, had exercised by filing the Cincinnati suit.207
The Chicago judge transferred the case to a federal district court in Pittsburgh,
even though neither side had requested that transfer.208
In Pittsburgh, the district court declined to exercise jurisdiction over the
declaratory action, allowing the second-filed Ohio suit to proceed.209  The
Pennsylvania district court cited a number of reasons for its decision,
including the fact that the second-filed action was “substantially further
along” than the case in its court.210  The court also noted the presence of
applicable exceptions to the first-filed rule, including an anticipatory suit and
forum shopping.211  The court also frowned on the use of a declaratory
judgment action “as a race for res judicata.”212
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choose the forum.
216. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).
217. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
218. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
Significantly, the court strongly stated its position on these types of
actions:
[T]his Court rules that the proper plaintiffs in an action to determine whether the
retirees’ retirement benefits can be unilaterally changed (and without notice) are the
retirees and the Union.  Further, that as the proper plaintiffs, the retirees and their
Union should be permitted to select the forum of their choice so long as the selected
forum has some nexus to the lawsuit.213
Framing the problem in this way is different from a blanket condemnation of
forum shopping.  The Crown court only briefly alluded to the substantive law
differences that motivated Crown to sue in the Seventh Circuit.214  It did not
raise the converse of that issue—the reasons why the retirees sought to be in
the Sixth Circuit.  The court disapproved of the company’s forum shopping,
but it implicitly recognized that the retirees, left to their own devices, would
do their own shopping; that strategy would be permissible because they were
the “proper” plaintiffs.215
Thus, the Pittsburgh court’s interpretation of forum shopping in first-filed
cases elevates the importance of first identifying the natural plaintiffs and then
acting to discourage forum shopping by the opposing party.  In Crown, the
company had reduced its benefits package and filed a declaratory judgment
action on the same day, without any notice to the retirees who then faced the
injury of diminished health benefits.216  This sequence of events parallels that
in ACF, where the Missouri court also invoked the natural-plaintiffs concept
to justify a departure from the first-filed rule.217
3.  UAW v. Dana Corp.
Dana, which preceded the ACF and Crown cases, is not a retiree benefits
case, but it presents an analogous fact pattern.218  In Dana, the UAW sought
to enforce the Dana Corporation’s compliance with an arbitrator’s award




222. Id. at *1-2.  In its subsequent ruling on this case, the court noted that Dana did not cite the
Declaratory Judgment Act when filing its action.  UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 2000 WL
1182883, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2000).  Instead, it filed under the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006).  Id.  After the court’s first ruling, Dana argued that cases involving
declaratory judgment actions and the first-filed rule did not apply to its situation because it had not filed
its complaint under the Declaratory Judgment Act.  Id.  However, the court noted that there was no
“meaningful difference” between the language of the two acts in terms of the declaratory relief that a party
could seek.  Id.  It then reaffirmed its ruling in favor of the union’s action.  Id.
223. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
224. Id. at *4.
225. Id. at *5.
relating to a labor disagreement.219  Following pre-agreed procedures, the
parties submitted the dispute to binding arbitration.220  After the arbitrator
sustained the union’s grievance, the union asked Dana if it intended to comply
with the decision.221  Dana responded that it was considering the arbitrator’s
decision, and then, while the union awaited its response, the company filed a
declaratory judgment complaint in federal district court in North Carolina to
vacate the award.222  The UAW filed its own action in federal district court in
Ohio four hours later.223  This case, too, invoked the natural-plaintiff concept
and specifically addressed the forum-shopping argument central to ACF and
Crown.
In determining whether to exercise its jurisdiction over Dana’s action, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio differentiated
forum shopping from forum selection:
The device of the declaratory judgment can thus, when cleverly employed, be an
effective aid to forum shopping by a party who anticipates that suit is about to be
filed against it.  Proper forum selection should not be confused with inappropriate
forum shopping.  A plaintiff seeking redress for a cognizable injury is entitled, to the
extent able to choose among several forums, to select the one that it finds most
attractive.  Forum shopping, on the other hand, occurs when a party, perceiving that
it may find itself forced into a disadvantageous forum, seeks to manipulate
procedural devices to secure an advantage which, were those devices not available,
it could not employ to defeat its opponent’s choice of forum.224
Given this caution, the court reasoned that Dana’s declaratory judgment
action was forum shopping, since it “was motivated by a desire to preempt the
choice of forum that otherwise would be for the union to make.”225  As in ACF
and Crown, the court expressly identified the union as the “true plaintiff” and
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The court stated that it remained “firmly of the view that the union is the true plaintiff, and, as such, is
entitled to choose its forum, and not to have that choice made for it by its adversary.”  Id.
229. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 2000 WL 1182883, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2000).
233. Id. at *2.
234. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *2-3 (D. Minn.
Oct. 30, 2003).  In support of these factors, the court cited Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Inverizon
International, Inc., 295 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 2002) and BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555 (8th Cir.
1995).  Both cases involved issues of federal-state parallel litigation, or inter-jurisdictional disputes,
compared to the retiree benefits cases, which present issues of federal-federal parallel litigation, or intra-
jurisdictional disputes.  Thus, the first-filed rule does not apply in the same way.  In Verizon, the court did
consider the order of filing.  Verizon, 295 F.3d at 874.  It was relevant that Verizon had filed its declaratory
ruled against Dana.226  The court denied Dana’s motion to dismiss, stay, or
transfer the case and ordered it to show cause why the court should not enjoin
it from further maintaining its declaratory judgment action.227  The court later
enjoined Dana from so doing.228
Further, the court stated a more general principle for first-filed disputes
involving declaratory judgment actions.229  According to the court, there
should be a presumption that the declaratory action should be dismissed or
stayed in favor of the coercive suit—that is, a preference for an exception to
the first-filed rule in these situations.230  “At the very least,” the court stated,
the plaintiff in the first-filed declaratory judgment action “should have the
burden of showing persuasive cause why its suit should not be dismissed or
enjoined.”231  Later, when holding that Dana had failed to do so, the court
reiterated that “the union, as the party seeking a remedy, stands in the posture
of a plaintiff, while Dana, the putative wrongdoer, finds itself defending
against that claim.”232  The plaintiff “is entitled to choose the forum,” the court
held.233
4.  Rexam, Inc. v. United Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC
Section II.B.1 of this Note describes the Rexam district court’s analysis
of the balance-of-convenience test.  Before applying that test, however, the
court considered whether it should exercise its jurisdiction to hear the
declaratory action because of other factors, including the possibility that
Rexam’s action was a wrongful preemptive strike or an attempt at forum
shopping.234  The court considered those issues twice, once in an analysis of
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judgment action first, though “not dispositive.”  Id.  The court reiterated that litigants should not use
declaratory judgments “defensively” in order to “deny a prospective plaintiff’s choice of forums.”  Id.
(citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Doe, 140 F.3d 785, 790 (8th Cir. 1998)).  According to the court,
Verizon had not engaged in improper forum shopping or filed an anticipatory suit.  Id. at 874.  The BASF
court held that a products liability defendant could not choose the forum by virtue of a declaratory judgment
action filed before the injured party’s claim.  BASF, 50 F.3d at 559.
235. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *2-3.  This analysis relied on the Wilton precedent, as well
as Verizon and BASF.  Id.
236. Id. at *4-5.  The court used the Northwest Airlines’ “two red flags” framework for this analysis.
Id.
237. Id. at *3.
238. Id.
239. Id. at *1.
240. Id.
241. Id. at *3.
242. Id. at *4-6 (discussing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir.
1993)).
243. Id. at *5.
244. Id. at *3.
245. Id. at *5.
246. Id.
its discretion to hear a declaratory judgment action,235 and once in an analysis
of the application of the first-filed rule.236  Ultimately, the court rejected both
of these similar arguments.237
First, Rexam’s suit did not fit the anticipatory suit exception.238  The
union first filed grievances against the changes to Rexam’s benefits plan in
December 2001.239  The parties met and exchanged information from February
through October 2002.240  It was not until May 2003 that Rexam filed its
suit.241  The court compared this fact pattern with that of Northwest Airlines,
where Northwest knew that American was considering litigation but there was
no documentation that litigation was imminent.242  The court in Northwest
Airlines had allowed Northwest’s suit to proceed.243  Similarly, in Rexam, the
union had referenced the possibility of litigation in a letter to Rexam in 2002,
but that letter did not state that litigation was imminent.244  According to the
court, Rexam, which initiated litigation six months later, had not “secretly
learned” of the union’s plan to sue and did not act in anticipation of a suit by
the union.245
Northwest Airlines’ second “red flag”—the presence of a declaratory
judgment action—did appear in this case.246  According to the court, Rexam
was legitimately interested in clarifying its ability to amend its plan and end
a series of expensive grievances.  The company wanted to remove a seventy-
nine million dollar liability attributable to retiree benefits from its balance
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Subsequently, the court denied Rexam’s motion for summary judgment.  Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. 03-2998
ADM/JJG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2006).  The court held that the unions had
alleged sufficient facts to preclude resolving the issue of whether benefits were vested on summary
judgment.  Id. at *32-33, *52.
251. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26,
2004).
252. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).  This case actually began when Crown filed in Chicago (Seventh Circuit).  Id. at *1.  At a status
conference, the Chicago judge transferred the case to the Western District of Pennsylvania (Third Circuit).
Id. at *2.  According to the Pittsburgh judge, “[s]upposedly neither side requested such a transfer.”  Id.
253. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
sheet.247  In its view, this liability “lower[ed] its stock value and impair[ed] its
ability to obtain financing.”248  Thus, although forum shopping might have
played a role in Rexam’s decision, it was not the sole motivating factor.249
The court held that Rexam had not “raced to the courthouse” to preempt the
union’s suit.250
C.  Common Threads
The district courts in ACF, Crown, Dana, and Rexam all sought to
reconcile the usual preference for allowing the first-filed case to proceed
where other factors bolstered the argument for taking the second-filed case.
In applying exceptions to the first-filed rule, all dealt with three common
themes.  First, the balance of conveniences was generally not a significant
factor.  Second, forum shopping and the possible presence of an anticipatory
suit were relevant.  Third, all disputes involved declaratory judgment actions.
In three of the four cases, the court’s identification of a natural plaintiff
unified these themes and led the court to resolve the first-filed dispute in favor
of the second-filed suit.
The first common theme is that the balance of convenience test was not,
in practice, a powerful analytical tool.  The district court in ACF never even
addressed the issue of convenience in its ruling.251  The Crown court briefly
noted that it had considered the relative conveniences and interests, but did
not describe the issue of convenience at all.252  After the district court in Ohio
described evidence of Dana’s forum shopping, it added that there was “no
other plausible explanation” for Dana’s decision to file in North Carolina
when its headquarters were in Ohio, along with likely witnesses.253  Thus,
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259. See Ellen E. Schultz, Plaintiff Cry: When Retirees Sue an Ex-Employer, WALL ST. J. ONLINE,
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describes the travails of a group of elderly retirees struggling to travel to the courthouse in Akron, Ohio,
from their homes in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Ohio, and Texas.  Id.
260. NOW Science & Health: Aging in America, Pension Benefits, Retiree Benefits, supra note 180;
see supra text accompanying notes 1-7; see also ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA,
2004 WL 3178257, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 26, 2004).
261. See infra text accompanying note 265.
262. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
“[t]he convenience of the parties could not have been a factor motivating
Dana’s decision to file . . . in North Carolina.”254  The Rexam court addressed
the location issue twice.  First, it reviewed factors relating to its discretion
over the declaratory judgment action,255 and then it considered the § 1404(a)
motion to transfer venue.256  It did not specifically address convenience when
applying the first-filed rule.257
Thus, in the four cases, convenience was only an issue in Rexam.  Even
there, the argument was stretched.  The court noted that Rexam had contacts
with forums throughout the country, so “there is no suggestion that filing suit
in Minnesota is any more arbitrary than bringing suit in one of the other forty-
seven states where retirees reside.”258  This reasoning might support a decision
not to refuse jurisdiction because of conveniences, but it is not a ringing
endorsement of the selection of the Minnesota venue.  Likewise, convenience
is not likely to be a determinative factor in other suits where the parties are
large, multi-state employers and retirees who are scattered across the country.
That said, convenience is not negligible for some parties, particularly elderly
retirees fighting to preserve health care benefits.259
Second, each court probed for evidence of an anticipatory suit and looked
for evidence of forum shopping.  ACF appeared to provoke the retirees to
threaten suit with its call to Mr. Chapman.260  Crown never gave the retirees
a chance to consider a first suit—it changed its benefits plan and filed suit on
the same day.261  The timing of Dana’s suit, filed before the company had
responded to the union’s query whether the company planned to sue, “strongly
suggest[ed] a preemptive purpose.”262  All three provided evidence to the
district court that the employer filed suit to preserve its choice of forum when
it knew that there was the potential of future litigation.  Rexam, on the other
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263. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *3 (D. Minn.
Oct. 30, 2003).
264. See also Hill, supra note 56, at 247-48 (describing the anticipatory suit exception as a “superset”
of the bad faith exception, which focuses on whether the first-filer unfairly won the race to the courthouse).
hand, openly discussed the benefit plan changes with the union for over a year
before filing suit.263
In these cases, the possibility of an anticipatory suit was useful mostly in
determining whether the declaratory judgment plaintiff had engaged in forum
shopping.  Whether or not there was actually notice of a coercive suit did not
seem to change the analysis.  Thus, Crown, where there was no actual threat
of litigation—because the retirees could not possibly have considered a suit
when they did not know the change was going to happen—is analytically
similar to ACF, where the company provoked the threat of a lawsuit.  It would
be inappropriate to create a legally relevant distinction between the two
situations by making it meaningful that one declaratory judgment plaintiff had
one day’s notice, and the other did not.  Thus, the presence of an anticipatory
suit, which is the first of Northwest Airlines’ “two red flags,” may be more
appropriately described as a tool in the search for evidence of forum
shopping.264  That search is the one that invokes the concept of the natural
plaintiff: the retirees in ACF and Crown can easily be described as natural
plaintiffs seeking redress for injuries caused by the defendant-company.
In these cases, courts found that forum shopping exists where the
company—the declaratory judgment plaintiff—races to the courthouse, as in
ACF, Crown, and Dana; but is not determinative where there does not appear
to be a race at all, as in Rexam.  Another way of analyzing the situation is from
the perspective of the natural plaintiff.  The companies surprised the retirees
in ACF and Crown with near-simultaneous announcements of benefit
reductions and litigation, giving them no time to assert their status as the
natural plaintiffs in the matter and select the forum of their choice.  In Rexam,
however, a year and a half of negotiations clouded the issue of which party
was the natural plaintiff.  Was it the union dealing with the benefit reductions,
or the company seeking a court determination to end a seemingly endless
series of grievances?  If the company could be characterized as a natural
plaintiff, then its Eighth Circuit suit would be a way to assert its forum-
selection rights, and not an example of forum shopping.  If Rexam was a
natural plaintiff, then allowing the union’s second-filed suit to proceed in the
Sixth Circuit would reward forum shopping on the union’s part.  An alternate
interpretation of Rexam is that both parties were arguably natural plaintiffs,
each of which was seeking to select the forum of its choice, in which case the
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265. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *2 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004); Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2004); Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *3-4; Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *5.
266. See, e.g., Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *2 (citing Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S.
277, 282 (1995)).
267. See, e.g., Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *4-5 (citing Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines,
Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1006-07 (8th Cir. 1993)).
268. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *6.
269. Id. at *2 (quoting Church of Scientology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir.
1979)).
270. Hill, supra note 56, at 255.
271. Three of the cases explicitly discussed the position of natural plaintiffs.  In ACF, the court
specifically distinguished the case with that of another where no other suit had been filed by the natural
plaintiffs.  ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004) (citing John Sorrell & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union, 37 F.3d 1302
(8th Cir. 1994)).  The Crown court held that the controversy should be resolved in the forum chosen by the
“natural plaintiffs.”  Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *3 (W.D. Pa.
Jan. 9, 2004).  The Dana court discussed the concern for ascertaining the identity of the “true plaintiffs.”
Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *4.  The Rexam court implicitly addressed the issue of natural
plaintiffs by focusing specifically on the motivations of Rexam, the declaratory plaintiff, for suing and its
purported injuries.  Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *3.
firm application of the first-filed rule made sense as a straightforward way of
solving a parallel-litigation problem.
Third, all cases considered the presence of a declaratory judgment action
as a factor in determining which of two parallel cases should proceed.265  The
courts noted that they had discretion over whether or not to exercise
jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action.266  In Northwest Airlines, the
fact that one side had brought a declaratory judgment action was a “red flag”
that prompted a closer examination of whether the first-filed rule should
apply.267  One court, Dana, even noted that there should be “a presumption
that a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in
favor of the substantive suit.”268  But the courts also recognized that the first-
filed rule “should not be disregarded lightly.”269  The goals of the Declaratory
Judgment Act would be thwarted if the party opposing the motion could too
easily displace that action with its own suit.270  Thus, it was not the fact, on its
own, that one suit involved a declaratory judgment action; instead, the courts
closely analyzed the nature of the litigation and the conduct of the parties.
They reached the nub of the analysis by invoking, either explicitly or
implicitly, the concept of the natural plaintiff.271
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272. See, e.g., Plating Res., Inc. v. UTI Corp., 47 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (“Having
decided that the three factors of the first-to-file rule are satisfied, the Court next considers whether equity
warrants dispensing with the rule in this case.”).
273. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *5 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
274. Id. at *5-6.
275. Id. at *6.
276. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).
277. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *2-4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
278. Id. at *4.
279. Id. at *5.
280. Id. at *6.
V.  FACTORING IN THE NATURAL-PLAINTIFF CONCEPT WHEN APPLYING THE
FIRST-FILED RULE
Courts considering abrogating the first-filed rule require a strong showing
that notions of “equity” demand such a course.272  In concurrent federal
litigation involving the first-filed rule, courts can successfully strike this
balance between the usefulness of a “bright line” rule and equity
considerations by invoking the concept of the natural plaintiff.
Three out of the four employer-union cases described in this Note either
explicitly or implicitly identified a natural plaintiff and held in favor of that
party.  The ACF court, which ruled on the retirees’ motion to dismiss or
transfer ACF’s declaratory action, explicitly identified the retirees as the
natural plaintiffs.273  As such, they should have had their choice of forum.274
Thus, the court granted their motion to transfer ACF’s case to the district court
in West Virginia.275  The Crown court also explicitly stated its case for the
natural plaintiff, holding that the retirees were the proper plaintiffs and as such
should have been able to select the forum.276
In its initial discussion of the case, the Dana court was not quite so
explicit.  First, it discussed the usual factors relevant to a decision to forego
the first-filer’s suit.277  Then it noted how other courts had expressed concern
over the identity of the natural plaintiff, and it, too, expressed disapproval of
a party who seeks to “manipulate procedural devices” to defeat the choice of
forum of its opponent, the party that was seeking redress for a “cognizable
injury.”278  The Dana court was persuaded that the company had acted in order
to “preempt” the choice of forum that should have been the union’s to make.279
In its initial order, the court concluded that the “successful grievant is the ‘true
plaintiff’” and ordered Dana to show cause why the court should not enjoin
it from maintaining its declaratory action.280  In its subsequent order enjoining
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281. UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 2000 WL 1182883, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2000).
282. Id. at *2.
283. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *4 (D. Minn.
Oct. 30, 2003).  Later, the district court denied Rexam’s motion for summary judgment.  Rexam, Inc. v.
USW, No. 03-2998 ADM/JJG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6579 (D. Minn. Feb. 21, 2006).
284. Rexam, Inc., 2003 WL 22477858, at *3.
285. ACF Indus. LLC v. Chapman, No. 4:03CV1765 HEA, 2004 WL 3178257, at *3 (E.D. Mo.
Aug. 26, 2004).
286. YACKLE , supra note 30, at 257.
287. Looking for a race to the courthouse and the presence of a declaratory judgment action are the
two “red flags” from Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir.
1993).
Dana from maintaining its declaratory judgment action, the court explicitly
affirmed its use of the natural-plaintiff concept to guide its decision.  It
explained that “the union, as the party seeking a remedy, stands in the posture
of a plaintiff, while Dana, the putative wrongdoer, finds itself defending
against that claim.”281  As a result, the court remained “firmly of the view that
the union is the true plaintiff, and, as such, is entitled to choose its forum, and
not to have that choice made for it by its adversary.”282
Rexam is the only case of the four examples that did not hold for the
union in the first-filed dispute.283  However, this result actually underscores
the usefulness of the natural-plaintiff framework.  In a case where there is no
clear natural plaintiff—as in Rexam, where the court sympathized with
Rexam’s desire to clarify its obligations after lengthy negotiations284—a
court’s strong preference to abide by the first-filed rule’s bright line is more
likely to prevail.
The courts in these four cases arguably got it right.  However, merely
reaching a just result would not serve the first-filed rule’s goals of consistency
and predictability.  Here, though, the four courts reached their conclusions in
a way that suggests a broader theme applicable to other first-filed disputes.
First, when considering the factors relevant to a first-filed dispute, a court
should examine the situation to ascertain if there is a natural plaintiff.  This
analysis incorporates the traditional emphasis on looking for inappropriate
forum shopping and “the proverbial race to the courthouse.”285  A natural
plaintiff may plausibly appear when an aggrieved party files a coercive suit,
one seeking a “traditional” remedy such as compensatory damages or an
injunction,286 after its opponent has already filed a declaratory judgment
action, at least partially in an attempt to secure the forum of its choice.287
Second, if there is a natural plaintiff, and that party has lost the race to the
courthouse, then the court should look skeptically at the first-filer’s suit.  In
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288. The Dana court called for a burden-shifting approach.  When a declaratory judgment plaintiff
is not the natural plaintiff, that party “should have the burden of showing persuasive cause why its suit
should not be dismissed or enjoined.”  UAW v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *6
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999).
289. See supra Section II.B for a discussion of approaches to the first-filed test.
290. Hill, supra note 56, at 239.
291. For example, after discussing the “true plaintiff” and Dana’s desire to preempt the union’s
choice of forum, the Dana court stated that “there is no other plausible explanation for Dana’s actions.  The
convenience of the parties could not have been a factor motivating Dana’s decision to file in the Northern
District of North Carolina.”  Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *5.
292. See supra Section IV.B.4.
this context, the court must be persuaded that the first-filed suit should not be
dismissed or enjoined in favor of the natural plaintiff’s second-filed suit.288
That analysis would refer to established precedents of that court’s circuit289
but within a context of greater deference to the interests of the second-filing
party than apparent in a plain statement of the first-filed rule.
This approach furthers the plaintiff’s privilege in selecting a forum, given
that the court has carefully determined which party is the proper plaintiff.  It
provides a rationale for taking an unusually skeptical look at the first-filer’s
choice of forum and improves on the practice of going through a “hodgepodge
of factors” in the decision-making process.290  Identifying a natural-plaintiff
provides a way for the court to assert its role as a neutral arbiter and prevent
one side from manipulating procedural devices to secure an advantage.  The
natural plaintiff approach does not require courts to change the factors that
they use to test whether or not to apply the first-filed rule.  Previous
precedents, such as Northwest Airline’s “two red flags,” preserve their vitality.
Instead, under this framework, courts would consider the concept of the
natural plaintiff and, where appropriate, vault it ahead of the other factors,
such as convenience and deterrence of forum shopping.
This emphasis is particularly appropriate when convenience is not much
of an issue and forum-shopping considerations may be equivocal.  For
example, neither the ACF, Crown, nor Dana courts devoted much time to a
discussion of convenience.291  The Rexam court addressed conveniences, but
it did so in a context where the natural-plaintiff concept was not as useful, and
thus that element retained more significance.292  All four courts discussed
forum shopping, but that designation is strained in a situation where both
parties are maneuvering to achieve their choice of forum.  For example, the
Dana court stressed the difference between “[p]roper forum selection,” an
entitlement held by a plaintiff seeking redress for a cognizable injury, and
“inappropriate forum shopping,” as when a party manipulates procedural
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293. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *4.
294. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. USW, No. 03-CV-1381, 2004 WL 117923, at *3-4 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9,
2004).
295. UAW v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1984).
296. Dana Corp., 1999 WL 33237054, at *4.
297. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99.
298. Nw. Airlines, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1007 (8th Cir. 1993).
299. See Hill, supra note 56, at 239; see also Daimler-Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 133
F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1043 n.2 (N.D. Ohio 2001) (“The Federal Circuit has . . . held that the first to file rule
will be applied more rigorously in patent cases to enable alleged infringers to relieve themselves of the
uncertainty that can result from a patent-holder’s delay in filing suit, and, as well, in view of the
consideration that all appeals in patent cases go to that court, thereby reducing the impetus to forum-
shop.”).
devices, such as application of the first-filed rule, to secure an advantage.293
The Crown court allowed the retirees and the union (the natural plaintiffs) to
select the forum of their choice, resulting in litigation in the Sixth Circuit,294
home to the Yard-Man inference.295  According to the Dana court’s definition
of forum shopping, the unions in those cases were engaged in “[p]roper forum
selection”—not “inappropriate forum shopping”296—but such a distinction,
which is not so black-and-white to start with, becomes even grayer when each
side is maneuvering to take advantage of a circuit split.
Courts face a long list of factors when they consider the application of the
first-filed rule.297  Sometimes they closely analyze only a few of those factors,
as when the Eighth Circuit scrutinizes the two red flags it deems particularly
significant.298  The natural-plaintiff concept would provide a framework for
interpreting cases involving a declaratory judgment action, a possible
anticipatory suit exception, and the presence of forum shopping.  It could
provide a useful tool for parties, such as the unions in retiree benefits cases,
to structure their arguments, as well as an analytical framework supporting a
court’s approach to justifying an abrogation of the first-filed rule.
Sometimes the natural-plaintiff factor would not apply.  It might have
limited usefulness in declaratory judgment actions involving patent disputes,
where the alleged infringer who files a declaratory judgment action to assert
its right to continue doing business could be characterized as the natural
plaintiff.  Faced with threats from the alleged patent holder to sue and recover
significant damages, the alleged infringer must choose between ceasing its
business involving that patent, or facing crippling penalties if found in
violation.299  Where each side claims the title of natural plaintiff, the
distinction is no longer useful.  Courts would then consider the usual factors,
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300. See Hill, supra note 56, for a discussion of the merits of abiding by the first-filed rule in the
context of patent litigation.
301. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *3 (D. Minn.
Oct. 30, 2003).  The court noted that Rexam
possessed a strong interest in initiating litigation beyond simply thwarting Defendants’ choice of
forum.  Rexam desires clarification about its ability to amend healthcare plans since several retirees
have filed individual grievances contesting reduced benefits.  These proceedings have been
repetitious and costly, and there is a likelihood of continued similar litigation. . . .  Plaintiff must
also include a seventy-nine million dollar liability on its balance sheet for retiree benefits.  In
Plaintiff’s view, this liability lowers its stock value and impairs its ability to obtain financing.
Id. (citations omitted).
302. In re Amendt, 169 F. App’x 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential).
303. Id.
304. Id.
such as the anticipatory suit exception, with the usual preference for adhering
to the first-filed rule.300
In the retiree benefits cases, each side could have claimed that it was a
legitimate plaintiff: the companies sought judicial determination of their
liabilities, and the retirees sought redress for the benefits cuts.  The Rexam
court sympathized with this argument, since Rexam had negotiated
extensively with the unions before filing its declaratory action.  Arguably, the
company believed it had to pursue court action to clarify its responsibilities.301
In contrast, in ACF and Crown, the companies filed suit immediately after
announcing benefit cuts, never giving the retirees a chance to assert their
status as natural plaintiffs.  Timing was also a factor in another similar case,
In re Amendt, in which the Third Circuit rejected the ACF court’s “natural
plaintiff” approach.302  In that case, the retirees “waited an entire year” after
the company had filed its declaratory action to bring their own suit; by that
time, the court presiding over the declaratory action had denied the retirees’
motion to transfer the action.303  The court was thus unsympathetic to their
“natural plaintiff” argument.  Significantly, In re Amendt involved a writ of
mandamus, an “extraordinary remedy,” thus distinguishing it from the ACF
case.304  Since both the timing of the lawsuits and the type of remedy
distinguish In re Amendt from ACF, the rejection of the natural-plaintiff
theory is not as forceful as it would be in a case where the context was more
similar to that of ACF.
The Dana court, though dealing with a different employer-union issue,
most explicitly called for a preference for allowing the coercive action to
proceed, even if it was filed after the declaratory action: “Cases construing the
interplay between declaratory judgment actions and suits based on the merits
of underlying substantive claims create, in practical effect, a presumption that
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309. Procedural maneuvering can be costly to the courts as well.  One commentator recognized that
critics of forum shopping “suggest that it is a waste of time, money, and resources,” but then stressed that
[a]s long as venue choices exist, venue will potentially be an issue that must be litigated by the
courts, just like evidentiary issues are litigated and other procedural issues are litigated. Sometimes
litigating venue will be expensive and will occupy a good deal of the court’s time, while in most
cases it will not be an issue.  Venue is no different from any other issue in a suit in terms of the
a first filed declaratory judgment action should be dismissed or stayed in favor
of the substantive suit.”305  Arguably, this analysis coexists uneasily with the
companies’ desire to employ the legitimate procedural mechanism of the
declaratory action.  Companies considering changes to retiree benefits plans
would argue they are merely pursuing the goals endorsed by the Declaratory
Judgment Act, which provides a tool to remove “uncertainty, insecurity, and
controversy” in legal relationships.306  Under Kerotest and Wilton, though,
courts may exercise their discretion in choosing whether or not to exercise
their jurisdiction over the declaratory action.307  Adding the natural-plaintiff
concept to the list of factors considered in a first-filed dispute is a reasonable
expansion of that list.  Such an approach provides a way for courts to deal
with forum shopping in situations such as retiree-benefits disputes, where the
choice of forum is extremely important, without necessarily affecting the
analysis in litigation where forum shopping is not as relevant, as in patent
cases.308
One reason to want to discourage a race to the courthouse is the desire to
avoid going to the courthouse at all.  If the parties can work out their
differences without litigation, so much the better.  Arguably, the circuit split
over the Yard-Man inference provides an incentive for both unions and
employers to file suit immediately if there are any potential changes to their
retiree benefits plans.  The union, either facing or fearing a declaratory
judgment action, will file in a forum that follows the Yard-Man inference,
while the company will aggressively pursue a venue that rejects that approach.
Perhaps two such future parties, predicting that a court would invoke the
concept of the natural plaintiff, would recognize that the retirees and their
unions would likely prevail in a first-filed dispute and would refrain from
costly, time-consuming procedural fencing in the first place.309  Or perhaps
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attention it deserves and the variations that will exist from one case to the next.
Algero, supra note 168, at 111.
310. Rexam, Inc. v. USW, No. Civ. 03-2998 ADM/AJB, 2003 WL 22477858, at *3 (D. Minn.
Oct. 30, 2003) (citing BASF Corp. v. Symington, 50 F.3d 555, 557-58 (8th Cir. 1995)).
311. The passage of time may make it harder to identify a natural plaintiff, but in this type of case,
it probably will not diminish the retirees’ frustrations with a system that turns them into defendants.  In the
course of the Rexam proceedings, a retiree was “mystified” when a deputy sheriff served him with a court
summons from his former employer, and was dismayed to find himself a defendant.  Shultz, supra note 1.
The retiree, George Kneifel, said, “I’m glad I was home when they came, because my wife had a stroke
about six years ago.  Suing retirees is a cowardly way to go about the whole thing.”  Id.
312. In re Amendt, 169 F. App’x 93, 97 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential) (rejecting the natural-
plaintiff theory).  The court noted that in the ACF case “the retirees responded promptly to the declaratory
judgment action, waiting less than two months to bring their own suit.  Here, the retirees waited an entire
year . . . .”  Id. (citation omitted).
313. See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Response to Professor
Clermont and Professor Eisenberg, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 1479, 1508 (1997) (“[T]he change in focus from
trial adjudication to pre-trial resolution reduces the legitimacy of the civil process.  Parties are in court to
resolve some substantive issue. . . .  [P]re-trial litigation often focuses on ancillary procedural issues, such
as the proper geographic location for a federal civil case. . . .  As ancillary procedural issues dominate over
substantive issues, parties lose connection with their own litigation.”).
314. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary,
not; the prospect, no matter how slim, of avoiding a Yard-Man court might
just be too tempting for a company seeking to reduce its retiree benefit
liabilities.  Regardless, applying the concept of the natural plaintiff could help
ensure that the natural plaintiffs preserve their “traditional right to choose the
forum and time of suit.”310  In the future, these natural plaintiffs will likely be
wary of the Rexam experience, where negotiating with the company over the
course of a year and a half and failing to file their own suit cost those retirees
that choice.311  Similarly, In re Amendt highlights the dangers of waiting to file
a coercive action.312
Any suggestion that district courts should depart from an easily
administered, bright-line rule in favor of a more nuanced analysis will face the
criticism that the proposed path will require too much effort, too much time
spent on procedural maneuvering, and too much sacrifice to the rule’s goals
of economy and efficiency.313  However, courts are already looking carefully
at issues of equity.  A clearer framework for examining these cases could help
the courts serve the interests of justice and, ideally, discourage that procedural
maneuvering in the first place.
Of course, a more obvious solution to the problem of procedural fencing
in retiree benefits litigation would be to resolve the circuit split that motivates
the parties.  Where there is the potential for concurrent federal-state court
litigation, venue matters; parties perceive quite different environments in
federal versus state courts.314  But venue should not matter quite so much in
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v. Dana Corp., No. 3:99CV7603, 1999 WL 33237054, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 1999) (“In any event,
Dana’s decision to sue before responding, as [the company representative] had told [the union
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the litigation of federal questions in federal courts.315  The Supreme Court
denied a petition for certiorari in the Yard-Man case.316  It has also denied
petitions for certiorari in cases applying or rejecting the Yard-Man317
inference.  Without resolution of the basis underlying the parties’
maneuvering, the procedural fencing will continue.
Mr. Chapman, the ACF retiree, was first astonished, and then outraged,
at ACF’s plan to cut his health care benefits.  His nearly immediate response
was to plan a lawsuit to protect his rights.  Before he could do so, though, he
found himself a defendant in ACF’s already-prepared declaratory judgment
action.318  As a retiree facing cuts to his health benefits plan, Mr. Chapman
would probably agree that he fits the characterization of a natural plaintiff.
These types of cases are a good fit for the natural-plaintiff approach.  It would
hardly serve the interests of justice to adhere to a rigid rule allowing the
companies to win a race to the courthouse before the retirees even knew there
was a race to be run.319
